Thursday, June 27, 2019

Richard Swinburne is Right About The Problem of Evil

Throughout the history of belief in God, both believers and non-believers alike have questioned how a loving God could ever allow suffering. In the Biblical book of Job, we find Job wrestling with God in face of the suffering that he faces at the hand of Satan. On the more philosophical side of things, we find Epicurus asking, ‘Is he [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?’ Many since Epicurus have asked the same question, and as a result have concluded that God cannot exist given the evil in the world.  

In the face of this challenge from evil, theists have had to come up with explanations for why a loving God might allow the evil that He does. There have been various different explanations offered. We will briefly lay out some of them here. 

Free Will Defence - God has endowed mankind with free will - the choice to choose between good and evil. The result of this is that some will choose evil over good, and, therefore, harm others. Evil is thus a cost of free will. The good of the gift of free will outweighs the evil caused by it 

Soul Making - Evil allows us to develop our character. Many report to become stronger, better people in face of suffering and struggle. While on the other hand many would say that those who are spoilt all too often have bad characters. God, therefore, allows suffering in order not to spoil us and to develop our character.

Hiddenness - God wished for us to freely choose to follow and worship Him, and not choose to follow and worship Him out of fear or coercion. But if God was plainly evident to us, no one would choose not to follow Him or choose not to do any evil. After all, who runs a red light when a policeman is in the car behind them? God, therefore, makes himself hidden to give us a real free choice. But in order to do this, God must add some doubt to his existence and therefore allows evil. 

Afterlife - God will recompense those who have done good in this life with an eternal afterlife of bliss. Thus, any evil suffered in this life will be more than compensated in the next. 

Howbeit, most are convinced that while these arguments may raise the probability for why God may allow suffering, they do not provide a full defence to the problem of evil. Theists, therefore, have often deployed a sceptical theist response. The sceptical theist response says that we are not in a good epistemic situation to make the probabilistic judgment that a good God would allow for the kind evil that he does. As finite beings, we are limited in knowledge and reasoning capacity. God, however, is infinite. His knowledge and power is far greater than ours; He can see all of history before him and providently guides it by his will; therefore, what may seem pointless on our limited framework may not be pointless in the grand-scheme of God’s wider framework. The seemingly pointless death of a couple’s child could be the cause of a chain of events that leads to some greater good that would not have come about had the child not died. The child’s death, therefore, is not ultimately pointless and God, who saw what the death would lead to, is not failing on his omnibenevolence for permitting it. 

The sceptical theist card is popular amongst theists. Nevertheless, there is a problem with it - namely, that it appears to make God into an impersonal being who treats His creatures as a means to an end towards some greater good. But this is contrary to the God of Christian theism who cares individually for each of His creatures. Is there a way to salvage the sceptical theist response? I think there is. 

In the debate, God - For and Against - C4 - 1993, Richard Swinburne says the following: 

Could we talk about Auschwitz?… God wants the best for us. He wants us to be heroes. He is not interested in us having little tingles of pleasure every now and again. He wants us to be worthy people; be great people. And we can only be great people if there are great choices for us. Auschwitz gave us great choices. It is not something I wish to see repeated, but one can be grateful for what was shown that occasion. And finally, there is this great good for the victims, that perhaps even they did not always appreciate; that they were of use. One of the terrible things that can happen to a man in our world is to not be of use - not to be any use at all to anybody. One thing the victims of Auschwitz were is of use because it was their suffering which provided the opportunity for the German guards, who were also human beings who also had tremendous choices, to make the choice. And we can be grateful for that too. 

‘May you rot in hell’ was Peter Atkins’ response to this quote during the debate. Many too, myself included, at first sight find this quote repulsive. Nevertheless, upon further reflection I have come to conclude that Swinburne must be right. Whatever reason God has for allowing suffering must be of some good to the person whom undergoes the suffering if it is going to be consistent with God’s omnibenevolent nature. God does not use people as a means to an end. 

Swinburne is correct that pleasure is not the only good that exists. To have meaning - that is to live a meaningful life - is also of great importance. One way that one can be meaningful is to be used by God for some purpose of His. Such meaning could have eternal significance and therefore be eternally meaningful. Consider (for example) a couple who lose their infant child to a seemingly pointless disease. The couple, understandably, are deeply upset and grieved; nevertheless, through their suffering they contemplate the higher things in life and decide to place faith in God, understanding Him to be the only being who can make sense of their suffering. The couple go on to be great missionaries and end up doing a great deal of good, through their Gospel preaching and acts of charity. Now, this good that came from the death of this infant and the suffering of the couple gives the infant and the couple meaning. Many may fill the afterlife who are thankful for the suffering of infant and couple as it lead to their own salvation. And to be meaningful in this way is a good both to the couple and the infant. God, therefore, in using the death of the infant to promote greater good, cannot be accused of using the infant or the couple as means to an end, with no good coming from the suffering for their own sakes. 

Thus, we see that Swinburne’s solution, rather than making God repulsive, vindicates Him. So, while I am not the biggest fan of the good professor, in this case I am inclined to say that he is right.