Calvinistic Molinism

For a long time philosophers and theologians have been trying to reconcile God’s sovereignty and determination over the universe with man’s freedom and responsibility. Often, responses have been unsatisfactory by either favouring a strong version of God’s sovereignty at the expense of man’s freedom, or a strong version of man’s freedom at the expense of God’s sovereignty. In this blog post, I will offer what I term the Calvinist Molinist solution, which attempts to mediate between these two extremes. However, before we can discuss what Calvinist Molinism is, we first have to examine Molinism itself.

Molinism is the theological model, first put forward by sixteenth century Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina as a solution to solve the sovereignty/freedom conflict, and is popular amongst contemporary philosophers such as William Lane Craig. The way Molinism attempts to solve the sovereignty/freedom conflict is by postulating that, in addition to God’s natural knowledge (knowledge of all modal truths) and free knowledge (knowledge God has about contingent affairs), God also has middle knowledge, which is knowledge of how creatures would have freely acted in non-actual circumstances. God, the Molinist says, in light of what He knows via His middle knowledge, chooses to actualise the circumstances that would bring about a world where creatures have freely chosen to act in a way that is most pleasing to Him. The Molinist maintains that God only ever actualises the best feasible world. A feasible world is a subset of possible worlds that are limited by subjunctive conditionals of creaturely freedom (henceforth SCCs) - what creatures would freely choose in a given circumstance. This is in contrast to any mere possible world, which may include scenarios where God overrides the free will of creatures to achieve some end. The molinist argues that SCCs are brute facts, and not grounded in God, which they believe must be argued to protect the freedom of man. 

Molinism has been popular amongst theologians and philosophers as it allows for both God to remain strongly sovereign while also preserving man’s freedom and responsibility. It also provides a solution to the problem of evil in that the culpability for evil, at least moral evil, can be grounded within the free actions of creatures. However, Molinism has serious problems, challenging God’s aseity and sovereignty, the doctrine of divine simplicity, and faces trouble when faced with the ‘truth-maker objection’.

Molinism threatens God’s sovereignty because it suggests that there are contingent facts that God has no control over. God is simply confronted with SCCs which He is beyond His power to do anything about. And this is not only problematic philosophically, but also Biblically, for the Bible asserts that God is sovereign over all of creation. (Job 42:2)

Molinism has the additional disadvantage of threatening divine attributes that are seen as essential to classical theism. For a start, Molinism poses a threat to the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity. Divine simplicity argues that God’s act of willing is identical to God’s act of knowing, and that these are both identical to God’s being. The problem with Molinism is that God is affected by the objects of middle knowledge in a way that entails that His knowledge could not be identical to His willing. Molinism also poses a threat to divine impassability, since it entails that God is affected and changed by the facts of middle knowledge. Moreover, Molinism challenges the doctrine of aseity, which says that God alone is self-sufficient and that all other things depend upon Him; for Molinism claims that these facts cannot be dependent upon God. This again has not only a philosophical disadvantage but a Biblical one too, conflicting with Col. 1.16. Of course, one could reject these doctrines, but this is a high metaphysical cost just to adhere to Molinism.

The final problem with Molinism is that it is incompatible with the truth-maker principle, which states that for any true proposition P, there is some entity which bears and grounds that truth, by virtue of which makes the proposition true. What makes it true that Caesar was assassinated on the Ides of March is the fact of him being so assassinated. Similarly, what makes it true that there are bears in Russia is the fact of there being bears in Russia. Molinism, however, brings into question this principle, since there can be no entity that grounds the truth of SCCs. It cannot exist within the creatures, as they are yet to exist, and the Molinist argues that it cannot exist within the mind of God as this would conflict with man’s freedom. 

While those who hold to Molinism have criticised the truth-maker theory and have asserted that SCCs can exist as brute fact, we should hesitate before rejecting the truth-maker principle for the following reasons. First, truth-maker theory prima-facie is a self-evident theory, and we should not reject a self-evident theory for a less evident theory (Molinism) without good reason. Second, if we reject the idea of truth makers, we are left without an explanation of what it is that makes a given proposition true, and are thus lead into indeterminacy. Third, to reject the truth-maker principle would also bring into question the validity of the principle of sufficient reason; this principle itself has admirable prima facie plausibility and if rejected would, as said by Alexander Pruss, undermine science (The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 255.) and philosophical argument. ('The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument', in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, 2009, p. 45)

Defenders of Molinism, such as Craig, have attempted to rebut this criticism by demonstrating that certain truths cannot have truth makers, which shows the truth-maker principle to be erroneous. (Craig, 'Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the Grounding Objection', Society of Christian Philosophers, 18(3):337-352, 2001) These truths are as follows:

(1) No physical objects exist. 

(2) Dinosaurs are extinct today.
(3) All ravens are black.
(4) Torturing a child is wrong.
(5) Napoleon lost the battle of waterloo.
(6) The US President will be a woman in 2070.

The problem with Craig’s counter-examples is that it relies on assumptions that are classically rejected by classical theists, such as nominalism and the A-theory of time. (2), (5), and (6) all have a truth-maker if we adopt a B-theory of time. (1)’s truth-maker can be explained by appealing to the totality of facts that exist, which includes the facts about the essences of things that exist within the mind of God and whether their potentialities have been actualised or not. This explanation, of course, is excluded on a nominalist account. (4) Can have a truth-maker, again by appealing to the essences of things. On classical essentialism, it is the essence of a thing that defines what is right or wrong for a thing to do. (3)’s truth-maker is also the essence that exists within the mind of God, which defines Raven’s as birds that are black. 

There is a lot more that can be said about truth-makers, but that is a subject for another blog post. Nevertheless, it should be clear that for the traditional classical theist, Craig’s counter-examples are not going to hold weight.

Given that Molinism has a high metaphysical cost, what might be offered in its place that overcomes these problems? I suggest Calvinistic Molinism. Calvinistic Molinism, instead of postulating SSCs as brute fact, instead argues that the SCCs exist within the mind of God as His thoughts. These SSCs are a result of our natures that first exist as essences, or blueprints, within God’s mind. Contrary to what the Molinist might say, it is hard to see why this ought to be taken as denying free will anymore than if the natures are just the result of some undetermined brute fact. Moreover, Calvinistic Molinism has the advantage that it can exist without conflicting with classical theism, and other intuitive principles while also preserving man’s freedom, since God’s sovereignty over the actions of creatures are not the direct result of His particular decrees. 

What might be said to be problematic with Calvinistic Molinism? Perhaps the biggest problem is that it makes the problem of evil more acute, making it seem to be the case that God is the author of sin. There are two ways that one could respond to this challenge. First, we might be able to say that while both God and y are equally responsible for creating s when y does sinful action s, they are not equally to blame. This is because blame attaches itself to intentions. We might be able to say, therefore, that the intention that God had for creating s was to promote the greatest good whereas the intention that y had was not but rather was to benefit himself, meaning that God is not blameworthy whereas y is. 

An additional response is to appeal to our inability to fully comprehend God and His influence over the world. It is wrong to imagine that the way God exercises control over His creation is similar to that of how a man has control over puppets. Instead, we should picture it as being analogous to how an author has control over the events of a novel. Within a crime novel, when the Butler murders Mrs White, we assume that the punishment that the Butler receives is just - we do not object because the story was determined and written by an author. In an analogous way, we can say that while God has control over His creation, the way He exercises His control is not one that violates man’s responsibility or makes God responsible for evil.

The Owen Dilemma

Perhaps John Owen’s best known argument is his dilemma aimed as a rebuttal of unlimited atonement - the view that Christ died for everyone. Owen’s dilemma, which we will call ‘The Owen Dilemma’, is found in his ginormous work ‘The Death of Death’, in which he says, 

If Christ died in the stead of all men, and made satisfaction for their sins, then he did it for all their sins, or only for some of their sins. If for some only, who then can be saved? If for all, why then are all not saved? They say it is because of their unbelief; they will not believe, and therefore are not saved. That unbelief, is it a sin, or is it not? If it be not, how can it be a cause of damnation? If it be, Christ died for it, or he did not, If he did not, then he died not for all the sins of all men. If he did, why is this an obstacle to their salvation? (Death of Death, Bk III, ch 3)

Simply put, The Owen Dilemma goes as follows: If unlimited atonement is true, then either Christ paid for all the sins of those for whom He died, including the sin of unbelief; or Christ did not pay for all the sins for those for whom He died.

The force of Owen's challenge lays on apparent theological problems entailed by the horns of this dilemma. The first horn is said to be problematic because if Christ died for all sins, including the sin of unbelief, then the debt that is owed to God has been completely paid; God, therefore, cannot punish anyone for unpaid debt. The second horn is problematic because if Christ did not cover all sins by His death then man will still have unpaid debt towards God, which would result in no man being saved as no man can render what is due to God. 

The Owen Dilemma is seen as a trump card by Owenites (I am using this term to describe those who hold to all five points of TULIP) who wish to defend limited atonement. If you have ever argued with an Owenite over limited atonement, you would likely have encountered this dilemma from him. However, the dilemma assumes a number of philosophical presuppositions concerning the mechanics of The Atonement that render serious problems for the Owenite account. 

One presupposition is that Christ’s atonement was a payment of a literal debt, such that once paid God could not demand anymore payment or punish anyone for non-payment. But is this the best understanding of The Atonement? I think not. This position finds little support Biblically. When the Bible does speak of the Atonement in terms of debt, the subject is the writing off of debt and not the payment of it (See the parables of the two debtors and unforgiving servant). Moreover, such a view is open to a powerful philosophical objection, first forwarded by Fausto Sozzini (The 16th century founder of the Socinian movement). 

If Christ’s punishment was payment of a literal debt for those who will be saved, the need of repentance and faith in Christ for the forgiveness of sins is made void. Christ would have fully paid the debt. God, therefore, would have no right to demand any more from His elect, including faith and repentance in Him. Indeed, if the Owenite system is correct every member of the elect would be born saved. To avoid this problem, the Owenite makes a distinction between the accomplishment of redemption and the application of redemption. The Owenite argues that the former is achieved by Christ without any reference to the actions of man but the latter is dependent upon man’s faith and repentance in Him. However, this distinction undermines the Owenite's thesis: separating the payment of the debt and the effect of this payment allows for the defender of unlimited atonement to provide an explanation as to why not everyone is saved, namely, because not everyone puts faith in Christ and thus reaps its benefits. 

Why, then, does the Owenite not accept unlimited atonement if he accepts this distinction? The reason is because of the other presuppositions held by the Owenite. 

The Owenite also argues that The Atonement can have no other purpose than the salvation of whom it was intended for. What is ironic about this Owenite presupposition is that it is commonly asserted but has virtually never been defended in any depth. This is likely due to the difficulty of defending such a presupposition. The reason why many Owenite forward this presupposition is because Scripture makes no mention of any other purpose besides the salvation of sinners. But this does not entail that there is no other purpose behind it. There are many things that Christians believe God does that we do not know the full purpose of — various cases of suffering, for instance. There are only a few places in the Bible where specific instances of suffering are said to have a purpose. However, it would be unwarranted to argue that suffering has no purposes besides those specific cases mentioned in the Bible. 

Our experience of nature also teaches us that many of God’s designs has multiple purposes. For instance, it would be wrong to state that the sun only has the purpose of providing light, for we know that it has the other purposes of producing heat, health by providing vitamin D, and securing the earth in its location within the universe. In times past these other purposes were unknown to mankind. Similarly, then, The Atonement may have other purposes that are not known to us. 

Having said all this, I do not think that the other purposes of The Atonement are completely unknown to us. Here are a few possible reasons for why God might have made The Atonement universal. The Bible teaches us that God is a God of love, this being a main premiss in John’s letters. I think it is more befitting and greater of a loving God that He provide provision for all rather than a select few. Universal atonement, therefore, is necessary if God is going to be maximally loving. A counterfactual argument can also be forwarded: it could be argued that the knowledge that Christ has died for all will lead more to place faith in Christ than if He only died for a select few. Universal atonement also frees God of any accusation of unfairness or lack of efficacy in His atonement. The reason The Atonement does not save all is not a failure on God’s part but only ever on man’s. Hence, as Luther so rightly said, no man can deceive himself and say, ‘The Lord died for Peter and Paul, but not for me’.

A third presupposition often held by the Owenites is that Christ took our sins upon Himself by taking them off us. The implication of this is that Christ could not have taken the sins of the whole world upon Himself, as then the world would be sinless (because all the sins were put on Christ) and thus all saved. This presupposition hardly needs much comment. It should be evident that this is not how our sin is imputed to Christ. We are not made sinless by having our sin taken off us but by identifying and becoming one with Christ. If the taking away of sin was sufficient to save us, then there would be no need for punishment. God would have only had to transfer our sin away from us onto someone or something else; and if this is the case, there seems to be little reason why God could not just have transferred the sin onto some animal. Moreover, if Christ bears our sin by taking it from us, it would imply that we become righteous by taking Christ’s righteousness from Him. But this is clearly absurd.

It should be clear that the presuppositions underlying The Owen Dilemma are to be rejected, and hence the Owen Dilemma itself. A better mechanic for understanding The Atonement that avoids the presuppositions of the Owenites, and the challenge of The Owen Dilemma against unlimited atonement will be offered in a later blog post.