Why The Common Cup Should Be Used For Holy Communion

In these perilous times of Covid-19, questions are being raised in the churches of Christ concerning the proper means of distributing the cup in our Holy Communion Services. Some are advocating abandoning the common cup in favour of the baptist shot-cups. The purpose of this blog is to advocate the use of the common cup, as well as to why other traditional methods of distributing the sacrament should be observed. Although, this is not to comment on whether Holy Communion should or should not be conducted during times of plague, which is best left to the discretion of the local priest.  

Before we begin our discussion, it is necessary to state where we stand in regards to the nature of this sacrament. We deny the doctrine of transubstantiation, which claims that there is a real change of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ. Equally, we deny the doctrine of the Zwinglians and baptists, who argue that the sacrament is nothing but a symbol and a reminder that Christ died for us; that there is no benefit beyond reminding us of Christ’s sacrifice upon the cross. Rather, we hold to the Calvinist position. The Calvinist understanding states that in the supper there is a promise, like there is in baptism - see here, which when grasped by faith brings benefits associated with the promise. 

We will illustrate the difference between the Zwinglian and the Calvinist doctrine, for there are those who claim that there is no difference at all. The Zwinglian understanding is like a man giving his friend a photograph by which to remember him by. The friend might have many happy thoughts when looking at the photograph as he remembers the man, he may remember things the man has done for him, or remember that the man has vowed to pay him some money and thus go to retrieve it from him, but here the benefits end, the photograph gives no benefit that pure memory and contemplation alone could not have given. Indeed, The Metropolitan Tabernacle church in London, which takes the Zwinglian position, during the Covid-19 period decided to ‘celebrate the Lord’s Table without the elements of the bread and wine’ by contemplation alone.

The Calvinist position, by contrast, is like a man who gives a lady a ring as a pledge to his devotion to her, and his care for her. The ring does serve as a memory of the man, but it also serves as a token of his promise. In a similar way, we say that within the institution of Holy Communion, God has given us a promise. This promise being that if we partake of the bread and wine with faith, we will receive the promises and benefits of the New Covenant. This is what Christ meant when He said, ‘This cup is the New Covenant in my blood, which is shed for you.’ Such benefits include spiritually feeding upon Christ and drinking His blood, and union with Him. 

With the Calvinist position in mind, we can make the following points as to why Holy Communion should be conducted with a common cup. 

(1) There are four recorded accounts in Scripture of Holy Communion (Matt. 26:26-29; Mark 14:22-25; Luke 22:15-20; 1 Cor. 11:23-25) In all of these accounts we can note that it is only a single cup (ποτήριον - neuter, singular, accusative) that Christ blessed and distributed to His disciples. This is made further clear from Matthew’s and Mark’s account which tells us that the disciples only drank from a single cup. (Matthew: Πίετε ἐξ αὐτοῦ πάντες Mark: ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἔπιον ἐξ αὐτοῦ). The words of Scripture, therefore, give preference to a common cup being used; and in so much as we wish to remain faithful to how Christ instituted this sacrament we should use a common cup; after all, He could have very easily instituted the Holy Toast, with all the disciples clanking their own cups together.

(2) Communion represents not only that we are one with Christ, but that we are also all one with each other through Christ. (1 Cor. 10) The cup represents the one death of Christ that we all partake of. Contrary to the modern individualistic ideas of baptist theology, the church should be pleased to affirm her communal nature. The individual cups completely destroy the symbolism of the Lord’s Supper as the sacrament of union with one another, where the man in rags partakes of the same cup as the king in robes. 

(3) It introduces an irreverence to the sacrament, making the supper akin to drinking vodka at a boozy Russian party. I have always felt like crying out, ‘for Mother Russia!’ when partaking in a communion service that involves the shot cups.

Moreover, it means that the consecrated wine cannot be fully consumed. Now, it might be argued that since there is no real change of the bread and wine, it does not matter if the the consecrated wine and bread are left unconsumed. However, there is a good reason why we ought to show reverence to the consecrated bread and wine, even when denying the doctrine of transubstantiation. For if we take a Calvinistic position, then we are stating that the bread and wine are tokens, signs, and symbols of God’s promise. And it is for this reason they should be treated respectfully. It would be an insult to a man if his wife threw her ring into the bin can. Seeing that we treat these earthly tokens with respect, does that not give us reason to treat the heavenly ones with all the more respect?

(4) It is contrary to the tradition and history of the church. (The shot-cups were introduced to the church in the late 1800s by a baptist church in New York and became popular in the 1960s, especially with the rise of HIV.) While it is true that tradition is not on equal par with Scripture, we should also not completely disregard what tradition has to tell us. And if the church has practiced Holy Communion in a particular way for a long period of time, we should give second thought before easily disregarding it.

(5) Individual cups also lend themselves to a tendency to have the bread and wine passed around rather than requiring the congregates to come forward to receive the elements. There is a big disadvantage with this. It makes it more difficult to opt out of partaking of the elements, especially if you are known to have taken before. If the plate and cups are being passed around the church, it is noticeably awkward to avoid taking a piece of bread or one of the small cups, inclining one to partake even if they themselves are not yet ready, or even worse pressuring an unbeliever to partake. It is for this reason that we should be invited forward to partake of the feast rather than have it thrust before us. An added benefit of this is that congregates who do not wish to partake can be asked to cross their arms for a blessing, which cannot be done if the elements are passed around.

(6) The individualism the shot-cups bring allow for there to be multiple elements suited to the individual needs of the congregation. Churches with the shot-cups now conduct Holy Communion with several elements: wine, grape-juice, gluten-free bread, fair-trade bread, grape-free wine, and so on. Now, it might be argued that it is pharisaical to insist on using alcoholic wine and proper bread. We must, however, reject this claim if we are going to remain faithful to Christ’s institution. For it was the elements of bread and wine that Christ chose to symbolise His promise, and despite what we think about the inadequacies of these elements, dare we say that Christ was mistaken in choosing them? that He should have picked more suitable elements? 

But what about those who have an intolerance to bread or cannot take wine? To these people the following considerations can be given. 

Regarding the bread, fully gluten-free bread is made from potatoes and cannot be regarded as bread. Nevertheless, there are proper breads that have the gluten reduced. If the priest is in a church with congregational members who suffer from an intolerance to bread, then he could consider ordering such bread. Depending upon the intolerance, it may be the case that a nibble of the bread can be taken, or that the negative effects of the intolerance can endured as part of suffering for Christ. (Of course, no congregate should ever put their life at risk or do something that seriously threatens their health!)

Regarding the wine, the wine is often watered down, and therefore its alcohol content weakened. For those who claim to be alcoholics, since there is no physical impairments preventing them from taking the wine, but rather a weakness of the will, they should pray to God that their will be strengthened as it is their duty to be able to partake in the sacrament.  

Yet, if none of these solutions work, a congregant can take only one element. It has been the traditional position of the church that the full blessings of the sacrament can be received by partaking of just one element. What we should not try and do is disregard the elements that Christ has chosen because we think them as inadequate. 

Addressing Health Concerns

At this point the objection will come that the common cup is unhygienic, and that with the rise of new understandings of how disease is spread we should adopt the shot-cups as a means to prevent the spread of disease. I have two things to say in response to this. 

First, we should remember that the supper was instituted by Christ with a single cup; as such, the church has practiced a common cup for two millennia. By changing to shot-cups in fear of disease - when Christ could have easily instituted a holy toast - shows lack of faith in Christ and His wisdom.

Second, evidence shows that priests, who have to finish off the remaining communion wine, do not get sick or unwell more often than priests of churches that choose to conduct Holy Communion with shot-cups. If care is taken, proper wiping etc., then the health concerns of sharing a common cup are minimal.

This is not to comment on whether during times of plague Holy Communion should be taken or not, but only that a solution can not be found in using individual shot-cups, and that the shot-cups can neither be used for Holy Communion in any other circumstances.

Why We Should Baptize Infants

In this blog post, I aim to offer a short defence of why we ought to baptize infants, albeit in a different way to how many evangelical presbyterians have chosen to argue. Instead, my own argument attempts to be more in line with how the early church fathers sought to support the doctrine of infant baptism, and thus have the advantage of historical unity behind it.

My defence begins with an examination of the nature of circumcision, in which I hope to show that circumcision had a dual purpose. The first purpose was to distinguish the Jews as God’s special people that God had set aside with a promised land and from whom God had promised the Messiah would come. The second purpose was to act as a sign and seal of the righteousness that is given by the Gospel offered through Christ. Next, we will then examine to see what link or similarity the old sacrament of circumcision has with the new sacrament of baptism. In doing this, we can shed greater light on the purpose of baptism and upon whom it is to be applied. 

That circumcision had a purpose of setting the Jews apart as God’s special people from whom the Messiah would come is clear in the Scriptures. In Genesis 17, God makes a covenant with Abraham and his seed regarding the land of Canaan. In this covenant, God promises to provide the Jews with a land and be a God to them so long as they keep faithful to Him. And this covenant was to last as long as their generations existed, which is until the destruction of the temple and the Jewish dispersion in AD 70. Until this time, we find God patiently and mercifully being a God towards the Jews, providing types and shadows of the coming Messiah, and prophets, such as Isaiah, who foretold of Christ’s coming. 

Yet, there is also a spiritual side to the sign of circumcision. We know this because of how St Paul expounds and explains the promise made to Abraham and the significance of his circumcision. In the fourth chapter of his epistle to the Romans, St Paul writes that circumcision was ‘a seal of the righteousness of [Abraham’s] faith’, and that Abraham had this righteousness because he believed on the promise of God (Rom. 4.3). The promise that St Paul is referring to is to be found in the twelfth chapter of Genesis where God promises that all families of the earth will be blessed through Abraham (Gen. 12.3). What is evident is that this promise is not fulfilled purely through Abraham’s natural prosperity as not all nations were descended from him, although many were; rather this promise is fulfilled through faith in Christ, who is descended from Abraham. Circumcision’s spiritual element is thus that it pointed to Christ and the righteousness that He provided. And this nothing but the promise of the Gospel. Indeed, this is confirmed by the Scriptures which state that through circumcision God promised to circumcise the hearts of his children, which is to say to make them righteous (Deut. 30.6; Jer. 4.4).

Since the spiritual element of circumcision was a Gospel promise, it had to be accepted by faith in order to be counted as effectual. If it was not accepted by faith, then as declared by St Paul in the fourth chapter of Romans, circumcision would be counted as ineffectual and count for nothing. It is for this reason St Paul rebukes the Jews who relied on their physical circumcision without faith in the spiritual side. Circumcision, then, was a means by which God offered the promise of the Gospel, which had to be accepted by faith; to reject this sacrament meant to reject the promise.

One at this point may argue that Abraham was circumcised posterior to his faith in the promise, so ask how can circumcision be the offer of God’s Gospel promise? Indeed, it was true that Abraham was circumcised posterior to his faith in the promise, but this was done so as to set an example to the children of Abraham and to declare that circumcision was indeed the sign of the promise. A parallel can be drawn here with the baptism of Christ. The reason Christ was baptized was not because He needed it but rather to set an example to all those who follow Him.

We can see then the clear dual nature of circumcision, there being a physical aspect and a more spiritual aspect. And that it was through the spiritual aspect that the grace of the Gospel was offered. So, what similarity does circumcision have with baptism? We are told by St Paul that baptism is the new circumcision of the heart. St Paul writes, ‘In whom also ye are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands, in putting off the body of the sins of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ: having been buried with him in baptism, wherein also ye are risen with him through the faith of the operation of God, who hath raised him from the dead.’ (Col. 2.11-12) Hence, whereas with the Old Covenant circumcision of the heart and all that which is signified by it is offered through circumcision, in the New Testament we find that it signified by baptism. 

That baptism offers the promise of salvation in a similar way that circumcision did is further attested by Scripture in numerous places. We find St Peter attesting in the second chapter of Acts that repentance and baptism are the means by which remission of sins and the gift of the Holy ghost is given. St Peter says, ‘Repent, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost.’ (Acts 2.38) And this is said in response to a question asked by the crowd present on how one is to be saved. If baptism did not save, can we suppose that the Apostle would have answered thus? Would we answer the same if we did not think baptism gave the remission of sins? Elsewhere, we find St Paul being exhorted by Ananias to wash away his sins through baptism (Acts 22.16). And in the third chapter of St Paul’s letter to the Galatians, St Paul argues that it is by baptism that we put on Christ (Gal. 3.27). It would do violence to this text to argue that St Paul here refers to another baptism, for he makes no such qualification. Besides, the Apostle writes similarly in the 6th chapter of his epistle to the Romans, where he states that through baptism we are buried with Christ. And there is no doubt that this refers to water baptism.

However, this is not to say that it is the mere act of baptism that saves; but like circumcision, baptism saves by believing the promise that is attached to it. St Peter makes this abundantly clear in his first epistle. After comparing the saving efficacy of baptism to Noah and the ark, St Peter clarifies his statement by stating that it is not the mere washing away of filth that saves us but an answer of good conscience towards God, which is made possible by Christ’s resurrection. (1 Pet. 3.20f) 

What we can see, then, is that just like circumcision, baptism is a promise of God that is offered to us, and that this offer ought to be accepted by us through faith. Now, if baptism is a promise that God offers to us, and not something that we do, then it should not matter who God offers it to, whether they are infants or adults. Our lack of faith, or anything we could do, does not make invalid the promise that God offers. Of course, God would not offer His promise to those who are incapable of receiving the promise He offers. Yet, there is no reason to think that infants cannot accept the promise that God offers through baptism. Rather, the Scriptures makes clear that quite the opposite is true, which can be easily demonstrated.

First, we told by the Scriptures that infants are in need of forgiveness of sins and the pardon of God just as much as everyone else. This is made clear by the Psalmist, who writes in the 51st Psalm that we are born sinful (Pslam 51.5). And all those who are sinful are in need of the pardoning grace that we have shown is connected to the sacrament of baptism. And, as John Owen states, if God denies the sign of baptism to infants, then infants cannot be saved. For those whom God denies His sign to, denies what is signified by that sign. Yet, since we know that infants can be saved, it follows that they ought to receive the sign through which God promises salvation.  

Second, we see countless examples of infants who express faith, and the expectation that infants can have faith. We see John the Baptist leaping in the womb of his mother, Elizabeth. We see the Psalmist write about infants whom have faith (Ps. 22.9-10, 71.5-6). Additionally, there are many statements by our Lord exalting the faith of children: He writes that we are to have childlike faith (Lk. 18.15ff), and that out of the mouth of infants God has prepared praise (Matt. 21.16); He tells us that we are to suffer the little children to come to Him and that to them belongs the kingdom of heaven (Matt. 19.13ff); He tells us that those who cause the little ones that believe in Him to stumble ought to have a millstone hung around their neck and be cast into the sea; and when speaking on the subject of repentance, Christ states that He has hidden it from the wise and given it to little children (Matt. 11.25). Moreover, we find St Paul speaking of St Timothy who knew the Holy Scriptures from a youth (2. Tim. 3.14-15), and giving exhortations to the children in his pastoral letters, which demonstrates that he considers them to be part of the church. (Eph 6.1-2; Col. 3.20)

If this is not enough to convince one that infants are capable of faith, then let us turn to how St Paul states in his epistle to the Philippians that faith is a gift from God and not something we provide (Phil. 1.29). For if faith is purely a gift from God, then why would he grant it only to adults and not to infants. What warrant do we have to state such a thing?

Since, then, it should be abundantly clear that infants are capable of faith, we lose all reason why we should not provide infants the promise of baptism which faith is meant to grasp on to. And that this should be the case in the New Covenant makes all the more sense once we consider the unchanging and loving nature of God. If infants are to be included in the Old Covenant, then we should expect that they would be included in the new, for the New Covenant is more inclusive than the old; it cannot be said that it shrinks to exclude those formerly included, without strong Scriptural warrant. But this is inconceivable, that God would move to exclude infants from His new covenant, when they were formally included in the old. 

This is why, since the time of the Apostles, who baptized whole households, to the present day, the church in large has always considered it good and pleasing to God to baptize infants.

Atonement and Union with Christ

A little while ago I wrote a critique of Anselm’s commercial theory of the Atonement. Since then, I have thought of another objection against a strict commercial understanding the Atonement. The objection is that if Christ’s death on the cross is just a literal payment of debt - the balancing of scales, then not only is repentance made redundant, as I said in my original blog, but we are also lead the position whereby union with Christ can play no part in Christ’s atoning work; for why do we need to be unified with Christ for Him to pay our debt? After all, I don’t need to be unified with a person if I am paying his debt or he is paying mine. 

Of course, one might deny that union with Christ has got anything to do with the Atonement. However, for many this is an unacceptable solution. Edwards, for instance, saw union with Christ as essential to how Christ’s atoning work is applied to us. He writes:

What is real is the union between Christ and his people, is the foundation of what is legal; that is, it is something really in them, and between them, uniting them, that is the ground of the suitableness of their being accounted as one by the Judge: and if there is any act, or qualification in believers, that is of that uniting nature, that it is meet on that account that the Judge should look upon ‘em, an accept ‘em as one, no wonder that upon the account of the same act or qualification, he should accept the satisfaction and merits of the one, for the other, as if it were their satisfaction and merits: it necessarily follows, or rather is implied. ('Justification by Faith', in Sermons and Discourses, 1734-1738, 158)

So, if we are persuaded, along with Edwards, that union with Christ plays an essential part in the Atonement, a commercial theory of it will need to be rejected. 

Anselm's Commercial Atonement - An Outstanding Theory?

There have been quite a few theories to explain the Biblical doctrine of the Atonement in church history. In this blog post, we will examine Anselm’s theory and see why it ought to be rejected.

Anselm argued that because of our sin we have brought great dishonour to God. Because of this, man had to either restore to God His honour that he had besmirched and offer compensation; or God would show that He was still Lord over man, and thus protect His honour by subjecting man to punishment. However, there was a problem. What could man offer to God as compensation? Anselm argued that man could only offer as compensation something that is not already owed by the person compensation is being paid to. But there is nothing man has that is not owed by God. He cannot offer obedience, as this is demanded by God. Nor could he offer repentance, as this too is demanded by God. What man could have offered was his life; however, Anselm says that man has forfeited his life through sin. 

This is where the need for the Atonement comes in. Because Christ was sinless, He did not owe His life to God as a debt and therefore could freely offer it to God as satisfaction. Moreover, because of the worth of a divine life, it was more than adequate compensation to cover the sins of the whole world.

There are many objections that can pitted against Anselm’s theory. There, is, however a common one that is no good. We will examine this first. It is said by some that Anselm is portraying God as a feudal monarch whose wounded ego demands some sort of satisfaction before he can forgive those that have offended His honour. The critics argue that it would be far greater if God magnanimously forgave the insult without demanding satisfaction. After all, are we not encouraged in the Bible to forgive those who have harmed us, even without reparations? 

However, this criticism will not work for two reasons. First, as has been noted by William Lane Craig (See his Cambridge Elements book on the Atonement), the fundamental concern of Anselm is not with God’s honour but with God’s justice and its moral demands. Indeed, sin is something that brings dishonour to God; yet, the reason why God cannot just overlook the offence is because it would be unjust to do so. Anselm says that if sin goes passed unpunished ‘there will be no difference between the guilty and the not guilty; and this is unbecoming to God.’ (I.12) It would make ‘injustice like God.’ The reason, therefore, why God cannot just compassionately forgive sin is because ‘such compassion on the part of God is wholly contrary to the divine justice, which allows nothing but the punishment as the recompense of sin’ (I.24). But how is it that justice determines what God does? Why does God, who is all powerful, not just ignore justice and forgive the injury done to Him? In response to this question, Anselm says that ‘There is nothing more just than supreme justice, which... is nothing else but God Himself.’ In other words, Anselm declares God to be justice itself, and God cannot be inconsistent with Himself. (I.12) 

Second, even if we grant the critics the possibility of God forgoing justice that He may forgive, this would not deal with the problem of shame. Now, there are some (See Stump’s work on the Atonement) that would claim that Anselm’s theory is not concerned with shame. I disagree. There are certainly implicit references to shame in his Cur Deus Homo (see Ch. XIV), and more explicit references in his other work: Anselm’s Meditations and Prayers make mention to shame. And this would make sense given the honour-shame culture Anselm was writing in. 

If God were to just forgive us without exacting punishment, then we would still feel ashamed. We would know that we had wronged God and His honour and had not done anything to make reparations. This would make it unbearable to dwell in God’s presence. The sacrifice of Christ allows us to offer to God something as a reparation for our sin and thus deal with the shame that we feel for having wronged God. And this is something that cannot be dealt with if God just forgives us without reparation, unless we adopt some counterintuitive position, such as God wiping our memories etc.

  

There are, however, real concerns with Anselm’s theory of the Atonement. To begin, Anselm's theory is viewed in entirely a commercial framework. What is unjust on Anselm’s theory is that there is a debt to be paid to God; God has been deprived of something that was His and justice demands that this is restored: ‘and this (what is just) is the sole and complete debt of honour which we owe to God’ (I.11 - Parenthesis Mine). This can be illustrated via the following analogy. Suppose that I steal £50 from Timothy. Now, on the restorative theory of justice advocated by Anselm, justice demands that I pay back Timothy the £50 that I stole and offer a bit more to make amends for the losses to him that were caused by my theft of the £50; as long as I restore and fix the damages caused, justice as been served.

Anselm is not without Biblical support for this ‘commercial view’ of the Atonement. Various Biblical passages liken the substitutionary atonement of Christ to debt or pecuniary payment. The Bible speaks of man being ransomed by Christ (1 Tim. 2.6), that man was bought with a price (1 Cor. 6.20), and that God removed the ordinances [which some interpret as debts] that stood against us (Col. 2.16). The question is how far are we to push this language? For pecuniary language can be used metaphorically, as when we speak of a criminal sentenced to gaol ‘paying for his crime’. So, are these verses to be taken literally, or metaphorically referring to some penalty or punishment that Christ had to pay? The issue with taking these verses literally, as Anselm does, is that God’s justice is then just concerned with the payment of debt — the balancing of scales — and not with condemnation being expressed against the act of the crime itself. In other words, Anselm’s theory fails to take into account the need for punishment for sin. Yet, there are many places in the Bible that portray the retributivist nature of God, and God’s displeasure at the act of sinning: ‘And I will punish the world for their evil, and the wicked for their iniquity’. (Isaiah 13.11; c.f. Psalm 5.5) 

A further consequence of Anselm’s lack of emphasis on punishment is that it does not adequately take into account the need of Christ’s suffering on the cross. Anselm does attempt to offer a reason for why the suffering of Christ was necessary. Anselm’s reason is that because man fell so easily, it is only fitting that Christ suffer and pay compensation with difficulty. Although, it is not immediately clear how this follows. On the commercial view that has been presented by Anselm, it seems that what matters is that God’s honour is restored with compensation, and that this is done by offering something up of great value voluntarily - a divine life in the case of Christ. But how this is done should be irrelevant. Going back to our previous example, if I owe Timothy £50, plus compensation, what matters is whether or not the sum is paid, not how it is paid. (We will assume I am not breaking the law, like robbing a bank etc. in order to pay Timothy.)

Now, it might be said that it brings more honour to God if Christ offers up something with difficulty than not with difficulty. Indeed, it is a greater honour to me if a low value gift is given to me by someone who had to spend a great part of his income to provide for it, than if it was given to me by someone with great wealth for whom the gift was a mere drop in the ocean of his income. The problem with this, however, is that Christ is worth such an infinite value that the offering of His death alone would be enough to satisfy the honour of God, without the need for the death to be difficult and painful. To argue that Christ’s life is not enough unless He suffers with pain and difficulty undermines His infinite value. Moreover, close reflection reveals that the reason why we value those who do things for us that are difficult is because they chose to still do that thing for us despite the fact that the act was difficult, and not because the act was difficult per se. It brings me no greater honour if my friend decides to do me a favour and makes it purposely difficult for himself than if he just took an easier option available to him. If I ask my friend to buy milk for my fridge — because I am too busy writing an essay to go myself — I will not be more thankful to him if he chose to walk to the grocers three miles away when he could have gone to the grocers half a mile away. Similarly, if it was possible for Christ to offer His life up in a simpler, easier way, it is not more honourable if He chooses to offer His life with great difficulty.

Another problem with Anselm’s "debt" theory of the Atonement is that it falls prey to Socinian objections. Faustus Socinus, the leader of this movement and from whom it derives its name, forwarded the following two objections against a commercial view of the Atonement, in his work On Jesus Christ Our Saviour (1578). 

First, he argued that if we view the Atonement as a debt, then it becomes difficult to see why anything is demanded of us once Christ has paid it. If Christ’s death was the payment for sin, then why do we need to repent and profess faith in Christ? The debt has already been paid and I should be free to go to heaven without God requiring repentance. (Gnomes 1990, III.9) Going back to our analogy, if Daniel pays Timothy my debt of £50, then Timothy has no right to demand any more money in relation to this debt from me. 

Second, he objected that a purely commercial view of the Atonement weakens the love and forgiveness of God: if all the Atonement does is pay my debt, then there is no forgiveness on God’s behalf - it is just a balancing of the scales. When I pay a creditor my debt, he does not forgive me. (Gnomes 1990, III.9) Yet, the Bible speaks of God as forgiving our debts: in the parable of the two debtors, the debt is not paid but forgiven by the master. (Lk. 7.36-50) 

It is likely that it is because of these problems that Anselm moved away from pressing his commercial view of the Atonement too hard and instead, inconsistently, moved to argue that what Christ paid was not literally our debt and the compensation required; but rather that we are to view Christ as offering something to God that was not demanded of Him, and because of this, He gains a reward for His service, and that because Christ as part of the Triune Godhead is in need of nothing, wishes that God gives this reward to mankind in the form of absolving him of his guilt.

This understanding, however, does not fit in with the rest of Anselm’s system, viz. Christ became man to pay off man’s debt and restore honour to God. If Christ’s death is not a payment of our literal debt but an earning of a reward that can be applied to anyone, then it becomes irrelevant whether Christ was man or not. Why did God have to become a man for the reward to be passed onto man? We could also ask why this reward could not have been given to the fallen angels. Anselm argues that this reward cannot be passed onto angels because Christ did not take the nature of an angel. (Ch. II.19) But how does this follow? If I earn a reward for a service I do, surely I should be able to bestow it upon whom I like whether it be a fellow human being or my pet cat, Miaow. Of course, it may be the case that the reward is specific to a particular class. A reward of a new book is not going to be much use to Miaow - at least not in the sense it is intended to be. However, it is difficult to see how the reward of having one’s debt canceled is specific to any particular class. An angel can make use of this reward just as much as I can. 

Additionally, it is unjust that a debt that justice dictates must be paid can be forgiven because of an action, which is not the paying of this debt, performed by another person. Again returning to our analogy, if justice dictates that I should pay Timothy back my £50 I owe him, then it would be unjust for him to wipe this debt as a reward for something his loyal servant decided to do. 

As we have seen, then, while Anselm’s theory might have prima-facie Biblical support, for the Bible does speak of the Atonement in pecuniary terms, it has serious problems when examined at a deeper level. These problems mean that Anselm’s theory of the Atonement, as presented in Cur Deus Homo, is inadequate. There may be amendments that can be made to his theory to mitigate these problems, but it is beyond this blog post to discuss such attempts here or other theories of the Atonement that might be offered as an alternative.

The Owen Dilemma

Perhaps John Owen’s best known argument is his dilemma aimed as a rebuttal of unlimited atonement - the view that Christ died for everyone. Owen’s dilemma, which we will call ‘The Owen Dilemma’, is found in his ginormous work ‘The Death of Death’, in which he says, 

If Christ died in the stead of all men, and made satisfaction for their sins, then he did it for all their sins, or only for some of their sins. If for some only, who then can be saved? If for all, why then are all not saved? They say it is because of their unbelief; they will not believe, and therefore are not saved. That unbelief, is it a sin, or is it not? If it be not, how can it be a cause of damnation? If it be, Christ died for it, or he did not, If he did not, then he died not for all the sins of all men. If he did, why is this an obstacle to their salvation? (Death of Death, Bk III, ch 3)

Simply put, The Owen Dilemma goes as follows: If unlimited atonement is true, then either Christ paid for all the sins of those for whom He died, including the sin of unbelief; or Christ did not pay for all the sins for those for whom He died.

The force of Owen's challenge lays on apparent theological problems entailed by the horns of this dilemma. The first horn is said to be problematic because if Christ died for all sins, including the sin of unbelief, then the debt that is owed to God has been completely paid; God, therefore, cannot punish anyone for unpaid debt. The second horn is problematic because if Christ did not cover all sins by His death then man will still have unpaid debt towards God, which would result in no man being saved as no man can render what is due to God. 

The Owen Dilemma is seen as a trump card by Owenites (I am using this term to describe those who hold to all five points of TULIP) who wish to defend limited atonement. If you have ever argued with an Owenite over limited atonement, you would likely have encountered this dilemma from him. However, the dilemma assumes a number of philosophical presuppositions concerning the mechanics of The Atonement that render serious problems for the Owenite account. 

One presupposition is that Christ’s atonement was a payment of a literal debt, such that once paid God could not demand anymore payment or punish anyone for non-payment. But is this the best understanding of The Atonement? I think not. This position finds little support Biblically. When the Bible does speak of the Atonement in terms of debt, the subject is the writing off of debt and not the payment of it (See the parables of the two debtors and unforgiving servant). Moreover, such a view is open to a powerful philosophical objection, first forwarded by Fausto Sozzini (The 16th century founder of the Socinian movement). 

If Christ’s punishment was payment of a literal debt for those who will be saved, the need of repentance and faith in Christ for the forgiveness of sins is made void. Christ would have fully paid the debt. God, therefore, would have no right to demand any more from His elect, including faith and repentance in Him. Indeed, if the Owenite system is correct every member of the elect would be born saved. To avoid this problem, the Owenite makes a distinction between the accomplishment of redemption and the application of redemption. The Owenite argues that the former is achieved by Christ without any reference to the actions of man but the latter is dependent upon man’s faith and repentance in Him. However, this distinction undermines the Owenite's thesis: separating the payment of the debt and the effect of this payment allows for the defender of unlimited atonement to provide an explanation as to why not everyone is saved, namely, because not everyone puts faith in Christ and thus reaps its benefits. 

Why, then, does the Owenite not accept unlimited atonement if he accepts this distinction? The reason is because of the other presuppositions held by the Owenite. 

The Owenite also argues that The Atonement can have no other purpose than the salvation of whom it was intended for. What is ironic about this Owenite presupposition is that it is commonly asserted but has virtually never been defended in any depth. This is likely due to the difficulty of defending such a presupposition. The reason why many Owenite forward this presupposition is because Scripture makes no mention of any other purpose besides the salvation of sinners. But this does not entail that there is no other purpose behind it. There are many things that Christians believe God does that we do not know the full purpose of — various cases of suffering, for instance. There are only a few places in the Bible where specific instances of suffering are said to have a purpose. However, it would be unwarranted to argue that suffering has no purposes besides those specific cases mentioned in the Bible. 

Our experience of nature also teaches us that many of God’s designs has multiple purposes. For instance, it would be wrong to state that the sun only has the purpose of providing light, for we know that it has the other purposes of producing heat, health by providing vitamin D, and securing the earth in its location within the universe. In times past these other purposes were unknown to mankind. Similarly, then, The Atonement may have other purposes that are not known to us. 

Having said all this, I do not think that the other purposes of The Atonement are completely unknown to us. Here are a few possible reasons for why God might have made The Atonement universal. The Bible teaches us that God is a God of love, this being a main premiss in John’s letters. I think it is more befitting and greater of a loving God that He provide provision for all rather than a select few. Universal atonement, therefore, is necessary if God is going to be maximally loving. A counterfactual argument can also be forwarded: it could be argued that the knowledge that Christ has died for all will lead more to place faith in Christ than if He only died for a select few. Universal atonement also frees God of any accusation of unfairness or lack of efficacy in His atonement. The reason The Atonement does not save all is not a failure on God’s part but only ever on man’s. Hence, as Luther so rightly said, no man can deceive himself and say, ‘The Lord died for Peter and Paul, but not for me’.

A third presupposition often held by the Owenites is that Christ took our sins upon Himself by taking them off us. The implication of this is that Christ could not have taken the sins of the whole world upon Himself, as then the world would be sinless (because all the sins were put on Christ) and thus all saved. This presupposition hardly needs much comment. It should be evident that this is not how our sin is imputed to Christ. We are not made sinless by having our sin taken off us but by identifying and becoming one with Christ. If the taking away of sin was sufficient to save us, then there would be no need for punishment. God would have only had to transfer our sin away from us onto someone or something else; and if this is the case, there seems to be little reason why God could not just have transferred the sin onto some animal. Moreover, if Christ bears our sin by taking it from us, it would imply that we become righteous by taking Christ’s righteousness from Him. But this is clearly absurd.

It should be clear that the presuppositions underlying The Owen Dilemma are to be rejected, and hence the Owen Dilemma itself. A better mechanic for understanding The Atonement that avoids the presuppositions of the Owenites, and the challenge of The Owen Dilemma against unlimited atonement will be offered in a later blog post.