Richard Swinburne is Right About The Problem of Evil

Throughout the history of belief in God, both believers and non-believers alike have questioned how a loving God could ever allow suffering. In the Biblical book of Job, we find Job wrestling with God in face of the suffering that he faces at the hand of Satan. On the more philosophical side of things, we find Epicurus asking, ‘Is he [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?’ Many since Epicurus have asked the same question, and as a result have concluded that God cannot exist given the evil in the world.  

In the face of this challenge from evil, theists have had to come up with explanations for why a loving God might allow the evil that He does. There have been various different explanations offered. We will briefly lay out some of them here. 

Free Will Defence - God has endowed mankind with free will - the choice to choose between good and evil. The result of this is that some will choose evil over good, and, therefore, harm others. Evil is thus a cost of free will. The good of the gift of free will outweighs the evil caused by it 

Soul Making - Evil allows us to develop our character. Many report to become stronger, better people in face of suffering and struggle. While on the other hand many would say that those who are spoilt all too often have bad characters. God, therefore, allows suffering in order not to spoil us and to develop our character.

Hiddenness - God wished for us to freely choose to follow and worship Him, and not choose to follow and worship Him out of fear or coercion. But if God was plainly evident to us, no one would choose not to follow Him or choose not to do any evil. After all, who runs a red light when a policeman is in the car behind them? God, therefore, makes himself hidden to give us a real free choice. But in order to do this, God must add some doubt to his existence and therefore allows evil. 

Afterlife - God will recompense those who have done good in this life with an eternal afterlife of bliss. Thus, any evil suffered in this life will be more than compensated in the next. 

Howbeit, most are convinced that while these arguments may raise the probability for why God may allow suffering, they do not provide a full defence to the problem of evil. Theists, therefore, have often deployed a sceptical theist response. The sceptical theist response says that we are not in a good epistemic situation to make the probabilistic judgment that a good God would allow for the kind evil that he does. As finite beings, we are limited in knowledge and reasoning capacity. God, however, is infinite. His knowledge and power is far greater than ours; He can see all of history before him and providently guides it by his will; therefore, what may seem pointless on our limited framework may not be pointless in the grand-scheme of God’s wider framework. The seemingly pointless death of a couple’s child could be the cause of a chain of events that leads to some greater good that would not have come about had the child not died. The child’s death, therefore, is not ultimately pointless and God, who saw what the death would lead to, is not failing on his omnibenevolence for permitting it. 

The sceptical theist card is popular amongst theists. Nevertheless, there is a problem with it - namely, that it appears to make God into an impersonal being who treats His creatures as a means to an end towards some greater good. But this is contrary to the God of Christian theism who cares individually for each of His creatures. Is there a way to salvage the sceptical theist response? I think there is. 

In the debate, God - For and Against - C4 - 1993, Richard Swinburne says the following: 

Could we talk about Auschwitz?… God wants the best for us. He wants us to be heroes. He is not interested in us having little tingles of pleasure every now and again. He wants us to be worthy people; be great people. And we can only be great people if there are great choices for us. Auschwitz gave us great choices. It is not something I wish to see repeated, but one can be grateful for what was shown that occasion. And finally, there is this great good for the victims, that perhaps even they did not always appreciate; that they were of use. One of the terrible things that can happen to a man in our world is to not be of use - not to be any use at all to anybody. One thing the victims of Auschwitz were is of use because it was their suffering which provided the opportunity for the German guards, who were also human beings who also had tremendous choices, to make the choice. And we can be grateful for that too. 

‘May you rot in hell’ was Peter Atkins’ response to this quote during the debate. Many too, myself included, at first sight find this quote repulsive. Nevertheless, upon further reflection I have come to conclude that Swinburne must be right. Whatever reason God has for allowing suffering must be of some good to the person whom undergoes the suffering if it is going to be consistent with God’s omnibenevolent nature. God does not use people as a means to an end. 

Swinburne is correct that pleasure is not the only good that exists. To have meaning - that is to live a meaningful life - is also of great importance. One way that one can be meaningful is to be used by God for some purpose of His. Such meaning could have eternal significance and therefore be eternally meaningful. Consider (for example) a couple who lose their infant child to a seemingly pointless disease. The couple, understandably, are deeply upset and grieved; nevertheless, through their suffering they contemplate the higher things in life and decide to place faith in God, understanding Him to be the only being who can make sense of their suffering. The couple go on to be great missionaries and end up doing a great deal of good, through their Gospel preaching and acts of charity. Now, this good that came from the death of this infant and the suffering of the couple gives the infant and the couple meaning. Many may fill the afterlife who are thankful for the suffering of infant and couple as it lead to their own salvation. And to be meaningful in this way is a good both to the couple and the infant. God, therefore, in using the death of the infant to promote greater good, cannot be accused of using the infant or the couple as means to an end, with no good coming from the suffering for their own sakes. 

Thus, we see that Swinburne’s solution, rather than making God repulsive, vindicates Him. So, while I am not the biggest fan of the good professor, in this case I am inclined to say that he is right. 

The Owen Dilemma

Perhaps John Owen’s best known argument is his dilemma aimed as a rebuttal of unlimited atonement - the view that Christ died for everyone. Owen’s dilemma, which we will call ‘The Owen Dilemma’, is found in his ginormous work ‘The Death of Death’, in which he says, 

If Christ died in the stead of all men, and made satisfaction for their sins, then he did it for all their sins, or only for some of their sins. If for some only, who then can be saved? If for all, why then are all not saved? They say it is because of their unbelief; they will not believe, and therefore are not saved. That unbelief, is it a sin, or is it not? If it be not, how can it be a cause of damnation? If it be, Christ died for it, or he did not, If he did not, then he died not for all the sins of all men. If he did, why is this an obstacle to their salvation? (Death of Death, Bk III, ch 3)

Simply put, The Owen Dilemma goes as follows: If unlimited atonement is true, then either Christ paid for all the sins of those for whom He died, including the sin of unbelief; or Christ did not pay for all the sins for those for whom He died.

The force of Owen's challenge lays on apparent theological problems entailed by the horns of this dilemma. The first horn is said to be problematic because if Christ died for all sins, including the sin of unbelief, then the debt that is owed to God has been completely paid; God, therefore, cannot punish anyone for unpaid debt. The second horn is problematic because if Christ did not cover all sins by His death then man will still have unpaid debt towards God, which would result in no man being saved as no man can render what is due to God. 

The Owen Dilemma is seen as a trump card by Owenites (I am using this term to describe those who hold to all five points of TULIP) who wish to defend limited atonement. If you have ever argued with an Owenite over limited atonement, you would likely have encountered this dilemma from him. However, the dilemma assumes a number of philosophical presuppositions concerning the mechanics of The Atonement that render serious problems for the Owenite account. 

One presupposition is that Christ’s atonement was a payment of a literal debt, such that once paid God could not demand anymore payment or punish anyone for non-payment. But is this the best understanding of The Atonement? I think not. This position finds little support Biblically. When the Bible does speak of the Atonement in terms of debt, the subject is the writing off of debt and not the payment of it (See the parables of the two debtors and unforgiving servant). Moreover, such a view is open to a powerful philosophical objection, first forwarded by Fausto Sozzini (The 16th century founder of the Socinian movement). 

If Christ’s punishment was payment of a literal debt for those who will be saved, the need of repentance and faith in Christ for the forgiveness of sins is made void. Christ would have fully paid the debt. God, therefore, would have no right to demand any more from His elect, including faith and repentance in Him. Indeed, if the Owenite system is correct every member of the elect would be born saved. To avoid this problem, the Owenite makes a distinction between the accomplishment of redemption and the application of redemption. The Owenite argues that the former is achieved by Christ without any reference to the actions of man but the latter is dependent upon man’s faith and repentance in Him. However, this distinction undermines the Owenite's thesis: separating the payment of the debt and the effect of this payment allows for the defender of unlimited atonement to provide an explanation as to why not everyone is saved, namely, because not everyone puts faith in Christ and thus reaps its benefits. 

Why, then, does the Owenite not accept unlimited atonement if he accepts this distinction? The reason is because of the other presuppositions held by the Owenite. 

The Owenite also argues that The Atonement can have no other purpose than the salvation of whom it was intended for. What is ironic about this Owenite presupposition is that it is commonly asserted but has virtually never been defended in any depth. This is likely due to the difficulty of defending such a presupposition. The reason why many Owenite forward this presupposition is because Scripture makes no mention of any other purpose besides the salvation of sinners. But this does not entail that there is no other purpose behind it. There are many things that Christians believe God does that we do not know the full purpose of — various cases of suffering, for instance. There are only a few places in the Bible where specific instances of suffering are said to have a purpose. However, it would be unwarranted to argue that suffering has no purposes besides those specific cases mentioned in the Bible. 

Our experience of nature also teaches us that many of God’s designs has multiple purposes. For instance, it would be wrong to state that the sun only has the purpose of providing light, for we know that it has the other purposes of producing heat, health by providing vitamin D, and securing the earth in its location within the universe. In times past these other purposes were unknown to mankind. Similarly, then, The Atonement may have other purposes that are not known to us. 

Having said all this, I do not think that the other purposes of The Atonement are completely unknown to us. Here are a few possible reasons for why God might have made The Atonement universal. The Bible teaches us that God is a God of love, this being a main premiss in John’s letters. I think it is more befitting and greater of a loving God that He provide provision for all rather than a select few. Universal atonement, therefore, is necessary if God is going to be maximally loving. A counterfactual argument can also be forwarded: it could be argued that the knowledge that Christ has died for all will lead more to place faith in Christ than if He only died for a select few. Universal atonement also frees God of any accusation of unfairness or lack of efficacy in His atonement. The reason The Atonement does not save all is not a failure on God’s part but only ever on man’s. Hence, as Luther so rightly said, no man can deceive himself and say, ‘The Lord died for Peter and Paul, but not for me’.

A third presupposition often held by the Owenites is that Christ took our sins upon Himself by taking them off us. The implication of this is that Christ could not have taken the sins of the whole world upon Himself, as then the world would be sinless (because all the sins were put on Christ) and thus all saved. This presupposition hardly needs much comment. It should be evident that this is not how our sin is imputed to Christ. We are not made sinless by having our sin taken off us but by identifying and becoming one with Christ. If the taking away of sin was sufficient to save us, then there would be no need for punishment. God would have only had to transfer our sin away from us onto someone or something else; and if this is the case, there seems to be little reason why God could not just have transferred the sin onto some animal. Moreover, if Christ bears our sin by taking it from us, it would imply that we become righteous by taking Christ’s righteousness from Him. But this is clearly absurd.

It should be clear that the presuppositions underlying The Owen Dilemma are to be rejected, and hence the Owen Dilemma itself. A better mechanic for understanding The Atonement that avoids the presuppositions of the Owenites, and the challenge of The Owen Dilemma against unlimited atonement will be offered in a later blog post.